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How Should Colleges and
Universities Respond to Peer
Sexual Violence on Campus?
What the Current Legal
Environment Tells Us
Nancy Chi Cantalupo
Assistant Dean for Clinical Programs, Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, DC
cantalun@law.georgetown.edu
Over the last decade or so, various legal schemes such as the sta-
tutes and court or agency enforcement of Title IX and the Clery Act
have increasingly recognized that certain institutional responses perpe-
tuate a cycle of nonreporting and violence. This paper draws upon
comprehensive legal research conducted on how the law now regulates
school responses to campus peer sexual violence to show that schools
face much greater liability from failing to protect the rights of campus
peer sexual violence survivors than of any other group of students,
including alleged assailants. By encouraging their institutions to
develop more victim-centered responses to campus peer sexual violence,
advocates for women in higher education can respond to the current
legal environment, properly confront this problem, and help their
schools avoid liability.
An estimated 20–25% of undergraduate women are victims/
survivors1 of peer sexual violence (Benson, Gohm, & Gross, 2007,
p. 348; Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 6; Fisher, Cullen, & Turner, 2000,
p. 10), but 90% or more do not report the violence (Fisher et al.,
2000, p. 24). The main reason survivors do not report is that they think
no one will believe them and that various authorities, especially legal
and medical authorities, will be hostile (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993,
pp. 13, 63; Fisher et al., 2000, pp. 23–24; Warshaw, 1988, p. 50).
Studies on campus peer sexual violence suggest that college men say they
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would rape if they could be assured of not getting caught (Bohmer &
Parrot, p. 8; Warshaw, 1988, p. 97), that a small group of serial offenders
account for an overwhelming majority of the violence (Lisak & Miller,
2002, pp. 76–80; Sampson, 2003, p. 11), and that the failure of insti-
tutions to treat such violence seriously may encourage perpetrators to
continue perpetrating (Schwartz, DeKeseredy, Tait, & Alvi, 2001,
p. 630). Thus, one can see a vicious cycle between nonreporting of
campus peer sexual violence and the failure to prevent it. Perpetrators
rape because they think they will not get caught or because they actually
have not been caught, and, because survivors do not report the violence,
perpetrators are not caught, continue to believe they will not get caught,
and continue the violence.
Over the last decade or so, various legal schemes (including statutes
and court or administrative enforcement of the statutes) that apply to
campus peer sexual violence have increasingly recognized that certain
institutional responses perpetuate this cycle of nonreporting and violence
and that colleges and universities need to take a more victim-centered
approach in responding to this violence. First, laws such as Title IX of
the Educational Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), the Jeanne Clery
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act
(“Clery”) (ﬁrst passed in 1990 and amended to add the “Campus Sexual
Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights” in 1992), and the Violence Against
Women Act of 2000 (“VAWA”) have increasingly focused on campus
peer sexual violence. Second, these legal schemes have improved legal
protections for survivors against institutional mishandling, while school
action or inaction affecting other students, including alleged perpetrators,
has remained at a fairly low level of liability. Third, the schemes have
responded to the nonreporting problem, particularly to indications that
victims do not report as a result of chilling institutional responses, by
attempting to regulate these responses.
Accordingly, this paper will draw upon comprehensive legal research
I have conducted on how the law now regulates school responses to
campus peer sexual violence, research that is reviewed in greater detail in
my article “Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary through
the Ordinary,” published last June in the Journal of College and
University Law (Cantalupo, 2009). It will review that research with the
concerns of student affairs administrators in mind, as opposed to those of
the Journal of College and University Law’s primary audience, members
of the National Association of College and University Attorneys. It is
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intended, in particular, to give the policymakers who are involved in
designing their institutions’ responses to campus peer sexual violence, but
who are not necessarily lawyers, information about the legal environment
so they can use it to inform their policymaking. This information
demonstrates that institutions face much greater liability from failing to
protect the rights of campus peer sexual violence survivors than of any
other group of students, including alleged assailants.
Given the magnitude of the problem, it is critical that policymakers
and advocates for women in higher education understand these relatively
recent legal developments. The law makes it clear that many colleges and
universities need to adjust their institutional responses to campus peer
sexual violence to be more victim-centered, thereby encouraging reporting
of the violence. Therefore, this article ﬁrst reviews research delineating
the underlying problem of campus peer sexual violence. Then it discusses
the legislation, regulations, and case law that apply to campus peer sexual
violence. Finally, it concludes with recommendations for how colleges
and universities can move their institutional responses in a more victim-
centered, reporting-facilitative direction.
Campus Peer Sexual Violence
The legal regulation of school responses to campus peer sexual vio-
lence responds to and takes place in the context of the dynamics of
campus peer sexual violence. Therefore, it is important to begin with a
review of the empirical studies that have examined the problem. Of the
relatively few comprehensive studies that have been completed over the
last couple of decades, the ﬁndings and conclusions are relatively con-
sistent,2 and they indicate that “[r]ape is the most common violent crime
on American college campuses today” (Sampson, 2003, p. 1). Studies
estimate that 20–25% of college women are victims of forced sex during
their time in college (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 6; Benson et al., 2007,
p. 348; Fisher et al., 2000, p. 10). As many as 15% of college men
may also have been forced to have sex (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 6).
Studies on college men indicate that 6–14.9% of them “report acts that
meet legal deﬁnitions for rape or attempted rape” (Lisak & Miller, 2002,
p. 73).
Studies indicate that college and university women are particularly
vulnerable to sexual violence and that they often become victims of such
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violence shockingly early in their time on campus. Most victims are
between the ages of 15 and 24 (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 18), and
“experience rape at rates four times higher than the assault rate of all
women . . . College women are more at risk . . . than women the same age
but not in college” (Sampson, 2003, p. 2). Sexual assaults most often
happen during a victim’s ﬁrst year in college, often during the ﬁrst week
they are on campus (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 26). In one study, 12.8%
of completed rapes, 35% of attempted rapes, and 22.9% of threatened
rapes took place on a date (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 17). Most perpetrators
are known to the victim (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 26; Fisher et al.,
2000, p. 17), including classmates and friends (70% of completed or
attempted rapes) and boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (24.7% of completed
rapes and 14.5% of attempted rapes) (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 19). Often the
victim has been drinking or has been given alcohol (Sampson, 2003, p. 2).
As in the larger world, perpetrators are almost all men, and many
may be repeat perpetrators. “One [1997] study found that 96 college
men accounted for 187 rapes” (Sampson, 2003, p. 11), a ﬁnding corro-
borated by later research, including a study published in 2002. This
study surveyed 1882 male university students and found that 6.4% self-
reported acts qualifying as rape or attempted rape. Of this group, 63.3%
reported committing repeat rapes averaging about six rapes apiece. These
“undetected” (i.e., not arrested or prosecuted) rapists each committed an
average of 14 additional acts of interpersonal violence (battery, physical,
and/or sexual abuse of children, and sexual assault short of rape or
attempted rape), so that 4% of the students in the study accounted for
28% of the violence, nearly 10 times that of nonrapists (1.4 acts of vio-
lence apiece) and 3.5 times that of single-act rapists (3.9 acts of violence
apiece) (Lisak et al., pp. 76–80). A study in 1993 found that 35% of
college men indicated some likelihood they would rape if they could be
assured of getting away with it (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 8), and a
1986 study showed that 30% of men in general say they would commit
rape and 50% would “force a woman into having sex” if they were not
caught (Warshaw, 1988, p. 97).
Ninety percent or more of victims of sexual assault on college cam-
puses do not report the assault (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 24). Fear of hostile
treatment or disbelief by legal and medical authorities prevents 24.7% of
college rape victims from reporting (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, pp. 13, 63;
Fisher et al., 2000, p. 24; Warshaw, 1988, p. 50), and studies on atti-
tudes of law enforcement, judges, juries, and prosecutors indicate that
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this fear is well-founded (Lisak & Miller, 2002, p. 79; Mindlin, Vickers,
Harper, Lehman, Mangum, & Reardon, 2008, p. 8). Other factors
include not thinking a crime had been committed (Fisher et al., 2000,
p. 23), not thinking what had happened was serious enough to involve
law enforcement (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 23), not wanting family or
others to know (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 24), lack of proof (Fisher et al.,
2000, p. 24), embarrassment from publicity (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993,
p. 13; Warshaw, 1988, p. 50), lack of faith in or fear of court proceed-
ings or police ability to apprehend the perpetrator (Bohmer & Parrot,
1993, pp. 13, 63), fear of retribution from the perpetrator (Bohmer &
Parrot, 1993, pp. 13, 63), and belief that no one will believe them and
nothing will happen to the perpetrator (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, pp. 13,
63; Fisher et al., 2000, p. 23; Warshaw, 1988, p. 50). Not reporting,
being disbelieved, and ofﬁcial mishandling can increase survivor trauma
(Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, pp. 5, 198; Warshaw, 1988, p. 66). In con-
trast, both speaking with someone about the assault and reporting can be
therapeutic (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993, p. 235) and a necessary step to
recovery (Warshaw, 1988, p. 66).
The picture that these statistics paint is one of epidemic gender-
based campus violence that overwhelmingly does not reach the light of
day, with both the violence and the silence surrounding it having serious
consequences. In addition, they suggest how the problem of sexual vio-
lence may be perpetuated, at least in part, on college campuses. First, one
can see from the statistics a vicious cycle between the nonreporting of
campus sexual violence and the failure to prevent it. Second, the ages of
survivors and the timing of most campus sexual violence suggest that
perpetrators may select victims who are particularly vulnerable and
unlikely to have the resources at their disposal to report the violence.
Third, clearly institutions and their responses to the violence play a part
in the cycle of nonreporting and continued violence. On the survivor’s
side, research indicates that the main reason campus sexual violence survi-
vors do not report is that they do not think anyone will believe them and
that various authorities, especially legal and medical authorities, will be
hostile. On the perpetrator’s side, studies suggest that lack of “proper
guardianship” in terms of the failure of institutions to address the
campus peer sexual violence problem is a key and necessary element of
creating the problem in the ﬁrst place.
For example, a study by four sociologists and criminologists on
sexual assault on college campuses in Canada explains that “the amount
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and the location of crime are affected, if not caused, by three important
factors: the presence of likely offenders, who are presumed to be motiv-
ated to commit the crimes; the absence of effective guardians; and the
availability of suitable targets” (Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 625). This study
indicates that on college campuses “motivated male offenders view
women who drink and/or consume drugs as ‘suitable targets’; further,
these views are largely a function of ties and social exchanges with male
peers who perpetuate and legitimate sexual assault in college dating
relationships, in combination with the use of alcohol by the men them-
selves” (Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 647). In fact, “[u]ndergraduate men
who drank two or more times a week and who had friends who gave
them peer support for both emotional and physical partner abuse were
more than nine times as likely to report committing sexual abuse as men
reporting none of these three characteristics” (Schwartz et al., 2001,
p. 645). To complete the third prong of the formula, “college campuses
too often are ‘effective-guardian-absent.’ Many campus administrators do
not seriously punish men who abuse women sexually, even if they engage
in extremely brutal behavior such as gang rape. Even criminal justice per-
sonnel often disregard acquaintance and/or date rapes, essentially telling
men that their sexually aggressive behavior is acceptable” (Schwartz et al.,
2001, p. 630). In this climate “male peer support can be regarded as a
component of effective guardianship. When offenders receive either
encouragement or no punishment from peers, administrators, faculty,
and law enforcement ofﬁcials, then effective guardianship is lacking. On
the other hand, insofar as a man’s friends give no support for abuse, this
absence of support may well be the beginning of effective guardianship.”
(Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 646).
The Law Related to Campus Peer Sexual Violence
The consequences of this overwhelmingly unreported violence are
massive, for surviving students, the campus community as a whole, and
even perpetrating students. In light of the extent of the problem and the
large and diverse interests of the populations impacted by it, the law has
increasingly addressed campus peer sexual violence. Because education
law primarily regulates the behavior of the school and here the school’s
response is clearly very important, the applicable laws deal primarily with
the institution’s treatment of both the victim/accusing student and the
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perpetrator/accused student, and those students’ rights to some particular
treatment by the school. As the following review makes clear, while the
laws dealing with accused/perpetrating students’ rights are actually quite
minimal and have not expanded much since their development in the
1960s and 1970s, the laws dealing with the rights of accusing/surviving
students are more recent and continue to expand. Collectively, these laws
have created an environment that is increasingly protective of victims’
rights and supportive of victim-centered institutional responses to
campus peer sexual violence.
Surviving Students’ Rights: Increased Legal Concern
The rights of students who have survived campus peer sexual vio-
lence are primarily addressed by Title IX, Clery, and VAWA and these
laws have increasingly focused on campus peer sexual violence. First,
several of these laws have been amended to address this problem. For
instance, campus grants to fund programs that focus on peer sexual vio-
lence were added to VAWA in its ﬁrst reauthorization in 2000. Similarly,
Clery, which originally focused on the disclosure of campus crime stat-
istics, was amended in 1992 to add “The Campus Sexual Assault
Victim’s Bill of Rights” (CSAVBR). This amendment deals speciﬁcally
with the creation and communication to students of institutional
programs, policies, and procedures designed to prevent sexual violence
and to respond to it properly once it occurs (20 USC § 1092 (f )(8)
(2008)).
Second, provisions of both Clery and Title IX that were not necess-
arily created with campus peer sexual violence in mind have increasingly
been applied to it. For instance, while Clery deals mainly with crime
reporting, a private party may ﬁle a complaint with the Department of
Education’s regional ofﬁces (“DOE”), and the DOE can ﬁne or withhold
federal funding from colleges and universities that “ﬂagrantly or inten-
tionally” violate Clery or fail to remedy the violations (Security on
Campus, n.d.). Four institutions have been ﬁned to date for violations of
the act, at least in part for failing to properly report peer sexual violence.
The largest ﬁne involved a 2006 peer rape and murder at Eastern
Michigan University (“EMU”). The university initially told the victim’s
family that her death involved “no foul play,” then informed the family
over 2 months later of the arrest of the student who has since been con-
victed of raping and murdering her (Menard, 2007; Williams, 2008).
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EMU paid about $3.8 million as a result of the case, including $350,000
in Clery ﬁnes (Larcom, 2008; Schultz, 2007). The next largest ﬁne
($200,000) was levied against Salem International University (“SIU”) for
not including in their campus crime report ﬁve forcible sex offenses that
had been reported (Loreng, 2001). Miami University of Ohio (“MOH”)
was ﬁned $27,500 for a combination of underreporting various crimes,
including sex offenses, and other violations related to sexual violence
(Susman & Sikora, 1997). Lastly, Mount St. Clare College (“MSCC”)
was ﬁned $15,000, in part for two rapes that were reported but not listed
by the college (Leinwand, 2000).
The evolution of the application and enforcement of Title IX has
also progressively included more cases regarding peer sexual violence.
Title IX prohibits sexual harassment in schools as a form of sex discrimi-
nation (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001). Peer sexual violence counts as
hostile environment sexual harassment that is “so severe, pervasive and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an edu-
cational opportunity or beneﬁt” (Davis, 1999).
Under Title IX jurisprudence, schools may be held liable for peer
sexual harassment in two ways: (1) through administrative enforcement
by DOE’s Ofﬁce of Civil Rights (“OCR”) and (2) through private suits.
Schools agree to comply with Title IX in order to receive federal funds,
and a school risks that federal funding if OCR investigates and ﬁnds a
violation of Title IX (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001, p. 3). Fortunately for
schools, OCR must work with a school to achieve voluntary compliance
before taking steps to terminate a school’s funding (Ofﬁce for Civil
Rights, 2001, p. 15).
OCR enforcement generally takes place as a result of a complaint
being ﬁled regarding a school’s response to a sexual harassment case,
which causes OCR to undertake a fairly comprehensive investigation of
that school’s response system (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001, p. 14).
OCR cases are generally resolved through a “letter of ﬁnding” (“LOF”)
addressed to the school and written by OCR, which is sometimes
accompanied by a “commitment to resolve” (“CTR”) signed by the
school (Hicks, ¶322). Schools may look to OCR’s policy guidance to
determine how to comply with OCR’s requirements and make a com-
plaint and investigation less likely (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001, p. 14).
A surviving student might also ﬁle a lawsuit against a school, with
the potential of winning a monetary award, either instead of or in
addition to ﬁling a complaint with OCR (Davis, 1999, p. 632). The
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cases that are reported are typically those where the defendant school has
tried to keep a case from being decided by a jury by ﬁling a motion to
dismiss the case or a summary judgment motion. Both kinds of motions
are decided by a judge or judges. If a motion is decided in the defending
school’s favor, the case is ﬁnished and does not proceed to a jury. If a
motion is decided in the surviving student’s favor, the case may be
decided and a monetary compensation awarded by a jury, or the parties
may negotiate a settlement where the school generally pays the student
some agreed-upon amount and the parties may agree to other terms.
One survey of peer harassment cases against schools from approxi-
mately 1992 until 20083 shows a steady increase in individuals bringing
cases before both OCR and courts.4 Moreover, since 1999, when Davis
v. Monroe County Board of Education (“Davis”) settled that plaintiffs
could make claims under Title IX for peer sexual harassment (Davis,
1999, p. 632), one can see a shift from peer sexual harassment cases
decided by OCR to cases taken to courts. This not only represents an
increase in overall liability for schools but a trend toward the arguably
more expensive version of such liability. Finally, of the 40 Title IX court
cases considered for this paper,5 the surviving students prevailed in 24,
while the schools only prevailed in 16.
Surviving Students’ Rights: “Victim-centered” Responses to
Encourage Reporting
The history and current approaches to the enforcement of Clery and
Title IX also indicate that the laws relating to campus peer sexual vio-
lence are increasingly protective of victims’ rights. Moreover, this concern
with victims’ rights is linked to how violations of those rights may be dis-
couraging victims from reporting and not only not deterring the violence
but actually encouraging it.
The Clery Act: No Cover-ups of Campus Crime. CSAVBR is a
prime example of the linkages increasingly being made between
protecting victims’ rights, reporting and, ultimately, preventing campus
crime. This amendment requires schools to publish policies that inform
on-campus and off-campus communities of the school’s sexual violence
prevention programs and response procedures (20 USC § 1092 (f )(8)(B)
(2008)).
Several of the cases mentioned above, which have resulted in ﬁnes
to schools for violating Clery, have involved violations of CSAVBR or
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general concerns about the institution’s failure to assist victims in report-
ing and getting resources. In the SIU case, for instance, DOE indicated
that SIU did not regularly provide counseling and other victim support
services and that “several interviewees including former employees stated
that students are actively discouraged from reporting crimes to law en-
forcement or seeking relief through the campus judicial system” and are
“often met with threats, reprisals, or both” (Loreng, 2001). Furthermore,
both the university’s policies and evidence of its practice indicated that it
would not make accommodations for new living and academic arrange-
ments for victims following an assault and that survivors were inade-
quately informed of their rights to pursue disciplinary action against the
assailant (Loreng, 2001). Similarly, MOH was found to have “failed to
initiate and enforce appropriate procedures for notifying both parties of
the outcome of any institutional disciplinary proceeding brought alleging
a sex offense” (Carter, 2004b). Finally, MSCC was required to “agree . . .
to add other alleged [sexual] assaults to [its] crime reports” (Leinwand,
2000).
Many of the cases not leading to ﬁnes under Clery also deal with
sexual violence and have also resulted in important victim-centered enfor-
cement designed to encourage reporting. For instance, an issue quickly
arose under Clery regarding the CSAVBR provision “both the accuser
and the accused shall be informed of the outcome of any campus disci-
plinary proceeding brought alleging a sexual assault” (20 USC § 1092 (f )
(8)(B)(iv)(II) (2008)) and how this provision interacted with the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, which restricts disclosures by
educational institutions of information from a student’s educational
record, including the results of student disciplinary proceedings (Rooker,
2003). Universities concerned about whether an accuser, once informed
of a disciplinary procedure’s outcome, could then re-disclose that infor-
mation sought to resolve the question by requiring survivors to sign non-
disclosure agreements before they were informed of the outcome of
disciplinary proceedings (Gifford, 2008; Klinger, 2003).
Understandably, victims and victims’ advocates objected to such
measures because they compelled victims’ silence in a way that felt
re-victimizing (Dieringer, n.d.; UVA Victims of Rape, 2004). The DOE
settled the question in response to a complaint, making clear that such
compelled nondisclosure agreements are illegal under Clery: “Under the
University’s policy, a student who refused to execute an agreement would
be barred from receiving judicial outcomes and sanctions information.
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As a result, a key aim of the Clery Act—providing access to key infor-
mation to be used by affected persons in their recovery process—is
defeated” (Klinger, 2003). The DOE has recently conﬁrmed this
judgment, stating that “by requiring survivors of alleged sexual assaults to
abide by a conﬁdentiality policy that is inconsistent with the letter and
spirit of the Clery Act,” the institution had violated Clery (Gifford,
2008).
The language of both of these letters indicates that Clery and its
enforcement agents are concerned both with survivors’ rights and how
greater protection of those rights will facilitate survivors’ abilities to
report their cases. Cumulatively, enforcement of Clery demonstrates that
both the law and the interpreters and enforcers of the law are as much if
not more concerned with how colleges and universities treat survivors
and with how that treatment facilitates or hinders prevention of campus
crime, as they are with the underlying sexual violence.
Court Enforcement of Title IX: What Counts as “Deliberate
Indifference”. Enforcement of Title IX by courts and OCR in peer
sexual violence cases6 demonstrates similar concerns to those increasingly
evident in the enforcement of Clery. Here, too, one sees greater concern
with victims’ rights and recognition of how victim-centered institutional
responses can encourage reporting and prevention.
As noted above, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the
US Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could make claims under Title IX
for peer sexual harassment. Since then, most courts have allowed students
to sue a school for mishandling a peer harassment case if:
1. the school is a recipient of federal funding,
2. the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the edu-
cational opportunities or beneﬁts provided by the school,
3. the school had actual knowledge/notice of the harassment,
4. the school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment (S.S., 2008,
p. 726).
So many schools receive federal funds of some kind that the ﬁrst prong
is generally not in controversy. In addition, most cases of peer sexual
violence such as a sexual assault are accepted as being “severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive” enough “to deprive the plaintiff of access to
the educational opportunities or beneﬁts provided by the school” even if
they happen only once (Derby, 2006; p. 444; S.S., 2008, p. 737).7
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Therefore, most litigation focuses on the actual knowledge and deliberate
indifference prongs. The deliberate indifference prong is the focus here
because it deals with proper institutional responses to peer sexual
harassment.
Courts have deﬁned an institutional response as deliberately indiffer-
ent “when the defendant’s response to known discrimination is clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances, and when remedial
action only follows after a lengthy and unjustiﬁed delay.” The deliberate
indifference “must, at a minimum, cause students to undergo harassment
or make them liable or vulnerable to it” (Hamden, 2008, pp. *20–21,
quoting Davis, 1999, p. 645). With a few exceptions discussed at greater
length below, schools are rarely held responsible for the sexual violence
itself (Derby, 2006, pp. 445–446; Ray, 2000, p. 1170; S.S., 2008,
p. 738). Instead, the focus is on the institutional response postviolence.
As such, doing nothing at all is clearly unacceptable (Bashus, 2006,
pp. *10–11; Bruning, 2007, pp. 915–916; Derby, 2006, pp. 447–448;
E. Haven, 2006, pp. 63–65; James, 2008, p. *6; Jones, 2005, pp. 645–
646; Martin, 2006, p. 974; Ray, 2000, p. 1170; S.G., 2008, p. *15–16;
Theno, 2005, p. 1301).8 Schools must at least investigate claims of peer
harassment (Bruning, 2007, pp. 915–916; Murrell, 1999; Oyster River,
1997, p. 481; Ross, 2007, p. 1357; S.S., 2008, p. 738; Vance, 2000,
p. 259) and that investigation cannot involve merely accepting an
accused student’s denial at face value and not engaging in any credibility
determinations (S.S., 2008, p. 740). If their investigations indicate that
harassment did occur, some kind of disciplinary action is likely required
(Hamden, 2008, p. *5; Siewert, 2007, p. 954; S.S., 2008, p. 739;
Vance, 2000, p. 262; Oyster River, 1997, p. 481). While it is acknowl-
edged that victims have no right to demand any particular disciplinary or
remedial action on the part of a school (Clark, 2001, p. 1374; Fitzgerald,
2007, p. 175; Hamden, 2008, p. *22; Kelly, 2003, p. *4), if the particu-
lar disciplinary action taken fails to protect the victim or stop the harass-
ment, courts may fault the school for taking inadequate disciplinary
action (Derby, 2006, p. 447; M., 2008, p. *28; Siewert, 2007, p. 954).
Disciplining the harasser and the victim equally has been frowned upon
by courts (Erskine, 2006, p. *35; Siewert, 2007, p. 954; Theno, 2005,
pp. 1310–1311), and when schools are aware that a response method is
not achieving the goal of stopping the harassment, they may not continue
using that method alone and to no avail (Jones, 2005, p. 645; Martin,
2006, p. 974; Patterson, 2009, p. *32; S.S., 2008, p. 739; Vance, 2000,
NASPA Journal About Women in Higher Education◆60
doi:10.2202/1940-7882.1044 http://journals.naspa.org/njawhe/ © NASPA 2010 NJAWHE 2010, 3 (1)
p. 261). Finally, unjustiﬁed delay in responding can result in a school
being viewed as deliberately indifferent (E. Haven, 2006, p. 49;
Williams, 2007, p. 1289).
Courts are more likely to ﬁnd in favor of survivors when schools dis-
courage victims from reporting violence (Franklin, 1992, p. 64; Murrell,
1999, p. 1248; Oyster River, 1997, p. 479; Vance, 2000, p. 262). In
addition, courts disapprove of school actions that minimize the violence,
such as publicly characterizing the sexual assault on a plaintiff as “not
legal rape” (Kelly, 2003, p. *3; Siewert, 2007, p. 954) or show a bias in
favor of the accused student or against the accusing student (Brimﬁeld;
2008, p. 823; Derby, 2006, p. 447; Patterson, 2009, p. *4; S.S., 2008,
p. 740; Theno, 2005, pp. 1310–1311), as in a case where school admin-
istrators told a survivor that her assailant was “very bright, very intelligent,
and ‘going places’” and resisted enforcing a judicial stay-away order
(Erskine, 2006, pp. *33–34).
Clery’s CSAVBR provides that institutions must notify students of
“options for, and available assistance in, changing academic and living
situations after an alleged sexual assault incident, if so requested by the
victim and if such changes are reasonably available” (20 USC § 1092
(f )(8)(B)(vii)). Title IX case law echoes this support for such “interim
measures” to address survivors’ immediate needs, recognizing another
way in which a victim-centered approach is linked to the prevention of
peer sexual violence. Therefore, institutions will be liable for not taking
steps to protect the victim from having to constantly confront her
assailant while continuing with her education (Derby, 2006, p. 444;
Erskine, 2006, pp. *33–34; Hamden, 2008, p. *17; Kelly, 2003,
pp. *11–12; S.G., 2008, p. *10; S.S., 2008, pp. 742–743). For
instance, in Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., the victim was raped during
the summer off the grounds of her high school by another student. The
court stated that “A reasonable jury could conclude that Garcia’s pres-
ence at school throughout the school year was harassing to Mary Doe
because it exposed her to multiple encounters with him. Further
encounters, of any sort, between a rape victim and her attacker could
create an environment sufﬁciently hostile to deprive the victim of access
to educational opportunities provided to her at school” (Hamden, 2008,
pp. *16–17).
Interim measures are so important that, even when an institution
does separate the students, how the school does so can reﬂect on whether
its institutional response could be judged deliberately indifferent. For
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instance, some courts have indicated that requiring a victim to change
her housing, classes, or campus employment to avoid her assailant can be
indicia of deliberate indifference. In S.S., the plaintiff, a student assistant
equipment manager for the football team, was assaulted by one of the
players, and the court noted that the university’s repeated suggestion to
the plaintiff that she leave her job, whereas her rapist would remain on
the team, could be considered evidence of deliberate indifference (S.S.,
2008, p. 740). Other courts have criticized institutions for separating stu-
dents by moving the victim (Erskine, 2006, pp. *30–31; James, 2008,
p. *6; Oyster River, 1997, p. 472; Siewert, 2007, p. 954; Zamora, 2006,
p. 426). While there have been cases where an institution’s decision to
change the victim’s school or living arrangements instead of the perpetra-
tor’s has been upheld (KF’s Father, 2001; Manfredi, 2000), courts do
not appear to question changing an accused student’s arrangements, even
while an investigation is still ongoing (Clark, 2001; Gabrielle M., 2003;
Staehling, 2008; Wilson, 2001).9
Institutions particularly risk liability when their failure to protect
the survivor through separation and other interim measures results in her
being further harassed or retaliated against by the assailant or third
parties, thus further damaging the victim’s health, well-being, and ability
to enjoy the beneﬁts of her education (Bashus, 2006, pp. *10–11;
Brimﬁeld, 2008, p. 823; Derby, 2006, pp. 444–445; E. Haven,
2006, pp. 59–60; Erskine, 2006, p. *39; Hamden, 2008, p. *17; James,
2008, p. *6; Jones, 2005, pp. 645–646; M., 2008, p. *28; Martin,
2006, p. 974; Patterson, 2009, p. *33; S.G., 2008, p. *10; Theno,
2005, pp. 1310–1311).10 In cases where the plaintiffs were successful,
one student was harassed by her assailant’s friends, who would drive by
her and shout “slut” from their vehicle (Derby, 2006, pp. 444–445),
and another was so repeatedly harassed by both the accused student and
his friends that she became known “on campus as the ‘rape girl’”
and the ongoing trauma eventually led her to attempt suicide (Erskine,
2006, p. *22). Yet another was subjected to 5 weeks of constant harass-
ment by classmates, also leading to a suicide attempt (E. Haven, 2006,
p. 60).
In fact, courts have expressed concern that an institution’s failure to
respond properly to initial or repeated instances of harassment may
encourage the harassers. In Derby, for instance, the court notes that the
assailant who was not initially disciplined sexually assaulted a second
student (Derby, 2006; pp. 447–448). In other cases with successful
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plaintiffs, courts have not only drawn links between school inaction and
future violence (Ray, 2000, p. 1168; Siewert, 2007, p. 954), but have
noted when school ofﬁcials actually agreed with the harassers or laughed
at the harassment (Brimﬁeld; 2008, p. 823; Patterson, 2009, p. *4;
Theno, 2005, pp. 1310–1311). Indeed, many of the plaintiffs in these
cases end up leaving their schools to avoid harassment and retaliation,
and courts have treated this as evidence of deliberate indifference
(Brimﬁeld, 2008, p. 820; Bruning, 2007, pp. 910–911; Derby, 2006,
p. 445; Hamden, 2008, p. *17; James, 2008, p. *6; Patterson, 2009,
p. *12; S.G., 2008, p. *12; Siewert, 2007, p. 953; Theno, 2005, p. 1309;
Vance, 2000, pp. 256–257).
Finally, institutions have faced the most devastating judgments
where their actions actually facilitate or make women vulnerable to
sexual violence. In both Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder and Williams
v. Bd. of Regents, the plaintiffs were gang-raped by student athletes,
Simpson as a part of a football player recruiting event that the coach
knew had led to previous assaults (Simpson, 2007, pp. 1184–1185) and
Williams by a student who was recruited and admitted to the university
even though the coach, athletics director, and president knew that he
had criminal and disciplinary problems, including sexually violent behav-
ior (Williams, 2007, p. 1297). Simpson settled for $2.5 million, her co-
plaintiff got $350,000, and 13 university ofﬁcials were ﬁred, whereas
Williams’ settlement was in the six-ﬁgure range (Rosenfeld, 2008,
pp. 418–420).
OCR Enforcement of Title IX: Comprehensive, “Injunctive”
Relief. Survivors may also look to the administrative remedies of OCR
to protect their rights. OCR will not award monetary compensation to
complainants, but it will direct schools to change policies, procedures,
and other responses that do not comply with Title IX. Because it gives
institutions an opportunity to comply with its directives before taking
punitive measures, OCR’s substantive standards for what a school must
do to comply are more exacting. As a result, while this enforcement may
be less likely to compensate the student survivors who complain, the
relief and remedies OCR provides can still be powerful ways to change
institutional behavior.
OCR’s Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (“Revised Guidance”),
along with its LOFs/CTRs, demonstrates how OCR can reach a broader
range of school action and inaction than the Title IX case law does. First,
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both the Revised Guidance and LOFs/CTRs demonstrate OCR’s compre-
hensive approach to its enforcement and investigations. For instance, in
several investigations where OCR did not ﬁnd enough evidence to
support a violation of Title IX based on the facts alleged in the com-
plaint, it nevertheless found violations due to its comprehensive review of
the institution’s policies and procedures. Such violations include failing
to appoint or communicate the roles of the Title IX coordinator(s) or
other personnel involved in various parts of the harassment response
system (Hibino, 1996; Palomino, 1991, 1992, 1994a, b), unclearly
articulating policies and procedures such as timeframes, investigatory
steps, the informal complaint process, recordkeeping requirements, and
the range of remedies (Hibino, 1996, 1994; Kallem, 2004; Love, 2003;
Palomino, 1991, 1994b; Scott, 2001; ), and not following the school’s
own procedures (Scott, 2003).
More substantively, OCR has found the following institutional
responses to be inconsistent with or in violation of Title IX’s regulations
in cases involving peer sexual violence:
— Failing entirely to provide policies and procedures that victims can
use to complain about harassment or providing too many compli-
cated, conﬂicting and burdensome complaint procedures (Hibino,
1994; Palomino, 1994a; Shelton, 1993).
— Failing to treat rape and sexual assault as a Title IX matter
(Deering, 1996; Palomino, 1994a; Shelton, 1993).
— Failing to take any steps to respond to harassment or prevent harass-
ment from recurring (Furr, 2007; Lewis, 1993).
— Failing to inform victims of their options for redress (Hibino, 1994;
Palomino, 1994a).
— Actively discouraging victims from naming their harassers
(Palomino, 1994a).
— Requiring victims to confront their harassers before ﬁling a com-
plaint (Hughes, 2008).
— Failing to address victims’ safety concerns (Hibino, 1994; Palomino,
1994b).
— Unjustiﬁably delaying responses to and investigations of complaints
(Furr, 2005; Hibino, 1994; Love, 2003; Palomino, 1994b).
— Deferring to criminal investigations rather than conducting an inde-
pendent investigation by school ofﬁcials (Hibino, 1994; Lewis,
1993).
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— Inadequately investigating and/or tainting investigations through
bias, lack of objectivity, or asking victims inappropriate and humi-
liating questions (Furr, 2005; Palomino, 1994a, b).
— Keeping incomplete ﬁles on investigations and not making credi-
bility determinations regarding the victim’s and harasser’s stories
(Palomino, 1991).
— Providing informal complaint processes that lack structure
(Palomino, 1994a).
— Giving more procedural rights to the accused than to the accuser in a
fact-ﬁnding hearing/proceeding (Jackson, 1995; Palomino, 1994b).
— Prohibiting victims from being accompanied by an attorney
(Palomino, 1991).
— Placing additional evidentiary burdens on sexual assault victims
(Hibino, 2003).
— Using a “clear and convincing evidence” instead of a “preponder-
ance of the evidence” standard, as required by Title IX (Goldbecker,
2004; Jackson, 1995).
— Failing to discipline students for harassment (Hibino, 1994;
Shelton, 1993).
— Giving overly lenient sanctions to harassers and not providing sanc-
tions designed to end the harassment (Palomino, 1994a, b).
— Failing to notify victims of outcomes and sanctions imposed on har-
assers and disciplining victims for re-disclosing information about
disciplinary sanctions imposed on harassers (Gallagher, 2005;
Kallem, 2004; Palomino, 1991, 1994a).
— Not providing adequate training to designated employees
(Palomino, 1994a; Hibino, 1994, 1995; Scott, 2001).
Both the Revised Guidance and the LOFs/CTRs surveyed here echo
insights from the Title IX case law and the Clery Act. For example, once
a school has notice of harassment, it must “take immediate and appropri-
ate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take
prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment,
eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent har-
assment from occurring again.” Schools must respond to notice of harass-
ment in some way “whether or not the student who was harassed makes
a complaint or otherwise asks the school to take action,” although
schools should make every attempt not to compromise the victim’s conﬁ-
dentiality (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001, pp. 15–17).
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Also like the case law, the Revised Guidance takes a “victim-centered”
approach. It speciﬁes that schools may need to take interim measures
during the investigation of a complaint and that “[r]esponsive measures
. . . should be designed to minimize, as much as possible, the burden on
the student who was harassed.” Schools should “take steps to prevent any
further harassment” and may “be responsible for taking steps to remedy
the effects of the harassment,” especially if they delay responding or
respond inappropriately to the initial harassment. Schools should remem-
ber to protect the victim, the complainant, and any witnesses from reta-
liation following a report (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001, pp. 15–17).
Finally, schools should establish “prompt and equitable grievance pro-
cedures” to investigate and resolve cases (Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, 2001,
pp. 19–21), including that accuser and accused must be given substan-
tially equal procedural rights in fact-ﬁnding hearings or similar proceed-
ings, including to an attorney or advocate if one is provided or allowed to
either student. Also, such hearings or proceedings must use a “preponder-
ance of the evidence” standard, as the closest standard of proof to an
even playing ﬁeld.
This approach is consistent with ﬁndings OCR has made in its
investigations. In one case, OCR found that while the school had
promptly investigated, responded, and disciplined a teacher for harassing
a student, it had not attended to the student survivor’s emotional and
educational needs (Turnbull, 2004). In another, OCR cited approvingly
to the school’s immediate transfer of the alleged perpetrator out of the
dormitory in which the victim also lived, as well as the steps it took to
assist the survivor emotionally and academically (Turnbull, 2007).
Finally, several OCR cases have dealt with “prompt and equitable
grievance procedures.” In a teacher–student harassment case, OCR
required the school to change hearing procedures that allowed the pro-
fessor but not the student to inﬂuence the composition of the fact-
ﬁnding panel and to present evidence to the panel (Jackson, 1995).
OCR has also required at least two schools to change their “clear and
convincing evidence” to a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of
proof (Goldbecker, 2004; Jackson, 1995). In another group of cases,
OCR has required schools to change procedures where “[t]he focus of
the entire process seems more on the accused than the accuser” (Kallem,
2004; Metroactive News and Issues, 1998) and the accused was given
greater access to and opportunity to rebut evidence than were the accusers
(Palomino, 1994a).
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The Due Process Rights of the Accused
Given Title IX’s and Clery’s requirements, institutions’ responses in
these cases almost inevitably must involve the student accused of perpe-
trating peer sexual violence. The laws applicable to institutions’ powers to
discipline students have long recognized that those accused of misconduct
in school have certain due process rights. Therefore, it is important to
understand what the law requires in terms of an institution’s treatment of
an alleged perpetrator in order to get a full picture of proper and legal
school responses to campus peer sexual violence. Fortunately for schools,
the case law on how institutions must treat accused students allows
schools to meet the requirements of Title IX and Clery without running
afoul of accused students’ due process rights.
Institutions’ obligations to accused students depend on a variety of
factors, including whether the school is private or public, what state laws
apply,11 and what kind of disciplinary action is contemplated. All
accused students have some due process rights; the variation is in “what
process is due” (Morrissey, 1972, p. 481).
Disciplinary action that could result in expulsion from a public insti-
tution carries the heaviest burden for the school. Although the Supreme
Court has never decided a case involving expulsion from a public insti-
tution, in Goss v. Lopez, the court considered a 10-day suspension of a
group of students from a public high school. Some of the students were
involved in a series of demonstrations and protests that involved some
destruction of school property, but some of the students suspended
claimed to be innocent bystanders and were suspended without a hearing
(Lopez, 1975, p. 570). The Court decided that the students had both
property and liberty interests, and since “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
forbids the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law,” the students were entitled to due process consisting of
“some kind of notice and [] some kind of hearing” (Lopez, 1975, p. 579).
The Lopez Court cited approvingly to Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education, where the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals deﬁned what was
required for cases involving expulsion (Lopez, 1975, p. 576). Dixon
involved a group of students who were expelled from the Alabama State
College for Negroes for unspeciﬁed misconduct and without a hearing
but after they had all participated in a sit-in at an all-white lunch counter
in Montgomery (Dixon, 1961, p. 152). In its opinion, the 5th Circuit
set forth the requirements for due process before a state institution can
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expel a student, including notice of the charges, witnesses, and facts and
a hearing, “[t]he nature of [which] should vary depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the particular case.” In the case of a charge of misconduct,
the hearing must “give[] the Board or the administrative authorities of
the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail” and
the charged student an opportunity to present “his own defense against
the charges and to produce either oral testimony or written afﬁdavits of
witnesses in his behalf” (Dixon, 1961, pp. 158–159).
Both Lopez and Dixon were careful to specify that these requirements
fell short of “a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine
witnesses. . . [which] might be detrimental to the college’s educational
atmosphere and impractical to carry out” (Dixon, 1961, p. 159). In Lopez,
the Court makes clear that it was not “construing the Due Process Clause
to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspen-
sions must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own
witnesses to verify his version of the incident” (Lopez, 1975, p. 583).
Thus, even public institutions seeking to expel a student for mis-
conduct are not required to provide the full panoply of due process rights
that must be provided to a criminal defendant. For private institutions,
the requirements are even less onerous. While courts have reviewed
private institutions for expelling or suspending students in an arbitrary
and capricious manner (Abbariao, 1977; Ahlum, 1993; Coveney, 1983;
Rollins, 2001), most courts review private institutions disciplinary actions
under “the well settled rule that the relations between a student and a
private university are a matter of contract” (Dixon, 1961, p. 157).
Therefore, private schools are mainly bound by their own policies and
procedures regarding student discipline, which constitute the “contract”
with the student (Fellheimer, 1994; Hernandez; 1999; Schaer, 2000;
Trzop, 2004).
In a representative selection of cases where students have challenged
expulsions,12 courts have upheld expulsions for a wide range of student
behaviors, including ones where reasonable people might disagree as to
whether the underlying offense warranted expulsion. These include:
— students leaving false bomb threat notes in a school bathroom
(A.B., 2006),
— “peeping” under women’s skirts at a university library (Cloud,
1983),
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— smoking (Flint, 1975),
— participating in but withdrawing, prior to discovery, from a conspi-
racy to enter the high school with guns and shoot several students
and school ofﬁcials (Remer, 2002),
— “discipline problems” (which plaintiffs alleged were a pretext for
retaliation against the student’s parents for objections they made to
the school’s curriculum) (Gaston, 1998),
— drinking beer in the school parking lot (G.W., 2000),
— attempted possession of a controlled substance (Flaim, 2005),
— possession of marijuana (Keys, 2000),
— possession of a pellet gun (Rogers, 2001),
— brushing a teacher’s buttocks with the back of a hand on two
occasions (Brown, 2007),
— Attacking and striking other students in the halls of the school
(Linwood, 1972),
— Engaging in consensual sexual activity on school grounds (B.S.,
2003),
— Possession of a gun in a college dormitory room (Trzop, 2004),
— Engaging in a series of misbehavior including slashing a teacher’s
tires and selling illegal steroids (Hernandez, 1999),
— Shooting a classmate in the back with a BB gun (S.K., 2005), and
— Trying to keep two female students from entering their dormitory
room, where the plaintiff was found with two other male students
and the female students’ inebriated, unconscious, and half-naked
roommate (Coveney, 1983).
Like with expulsion cases, courts have refused to use the reviewing process
as an excuse to overturn school actions in peer sexual violence cases as well.
Signiﬁcant research on this point has discovered no cases where a court has
overturned a school’s decision to sanction a student for peer sexual vio-
lence and awarded the student monetary compensation. In contrast, courts
have rejected challenges to the admissibility of certain witnesses and evi-
dence (Brands, 1987, p. 632; Cloud, 1983, p. 724; Schaer, 2000, p. 380),
the right to know witnesses’ identities and to cross-examine them
(B.S., 2003, p. 899; Coplin, 1995, p. 1383; Gomes, 2005, p. 23), and
the rights to an attorney (Ahlum, 1993, p. 100; Coveney, 1983, p. 140),
discovery (Gomes, 2005, p. 19), voir dire (Gomes, 2005, p. 32), and
appeal (Gomes, 2005, p. 33). They have also allowed a victim to testify
behind a screen (Cloud, 1983, p. 724; Gomes, 2005, p. 29), and, in
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general, they consistently reiterate the distinction between disciplinary
hearings and criminal or judicial proceedings (Brands, 1987, p. 632;
Gomes, 2005, p. 17; Granowitz, 2003, p. 355; Ray, 1995, p. 712; Schaer,
2000, p. 381). Even where courts ﬁnd procedural violations, they generally
allow schools to ﬁx the procedural violation rather than awarding monetary
damages to the accused student (Fellheimer, 1994, p. 247; Marshall,
1980).
Moreover, these cases demonstrate that institutions may even take
actions prior to notice and a hearing without running afoul of due
process requirements. Indeed, Lopez itself acknowledges that it might be
necessary for a school to act quickly and prior to notice and a hearing
under certain circumstances: “Students whose presence poses a con-
tinuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting
the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such
cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as
soon as practicable” (Lopez, 1975, pp. 582–583). Courts have relied on
this language to allow institutions to take measures protecting accusers.
For instance, several courts have made it clear that schools may protect
accusers and witnesses by allowing them to submit witness statements
instead of appearing at the hearing (B.S., 2003, p. 899; Coplin, 1995,
p. 1383; Gomes, 2005, p. 23). In doing so, they have recognized that
such measures protect students who report misconduct from retaliation
(B.S., 2003, p. 901). In addition, in cases of peer sexual violence,
courts have supported institutions taking immediate action and sus-
pending or otherwise separating accused students prior to notice and a
hearing (Brands, 1987, p. 632; Jensen, 1999, p. 1272; J.S., 2005,
pp. 677–678).
Recommendations and Conclusion
An ongoing case at Ohio State University (“OSU”) resulting
from allegations that one male student sexually assaulted two female
students within weeks of each other illustrates to some extent the
current legal climate related to campus peer sexual violence. The two
alleged assaults took place in February of 2002, and in February of
2004 the survivor of the second sued the university, alleging violations
of Title IX under the Davis line of cases discussed above. The university
was granted summary judgment by the court in the university’s favor in
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September 2006 (Ohio State Univ., 2006). Security on Campus ﬁled a
complaint alleging that the university had violated Clery’s reporting pro-
visions on March 29, 2004, and on December 20, 2006 DOE found
the university in violation of Clery for underreporting, incomplete and
untimely reporting, and failure to issue timely warnings of campus
crime (Carter, 2004a; Jaros, 2006). Not even a month before the Clery
complaint was resolved, a second complaint was ﬁled, calling on OCR
to direct the university to adopt a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard in disciplinary proceedings (Security On Campus, 2006). The res-
olution of the OCR complaint has not been published and, presumably,
is still ongoing.
The expense of responding to charges of legal violations comes from
two sources. The ﬁrst is incurred when the charges are made, whether
through courts or administrative agencies, and the institution must spend
money to defend its actions and cooperate with an investigation. The
second comes if and when an institution loses or feels compelled to settle
a case. Although it is undoubtedly more difﬁcult to avoid the ﬁrst kind
of cost, the second is quite avoidable and the likelihood of winning or
losing is a factor that smart lawyers and parties on both sides will con-
sider before bringing a claim or crafting a defense strategy. And, of
course, the best option for avoiding both kinds of costs is to act from the
beginning in accordance with the law.
In the past, colleges and universities have been concerned about
incurring both kinds of costs as a result of lawsuits by students accused
of peer sexual violence who have been disciplined and feel they have been
mistreated by the institution. The legal analysis above demonstrates
that, while these students have the power to subject an institution to the
ﬁrst kind of cost listed above, the high unlikelihood of their winning a
lawsuit means that they will not be successful in forcing schools to pay
the second kind of cost. In addition, it gives any institution’s attorney
powerful arguments to dissuade the suit altogether.
In contrast, the OSU case shows that institutions are in a much
less favorable position vis-à-vis survivors suing for mishandling of
their campus peer sexual violence cases. Although the OSU student
survivor did not prevail in her private suit under Title IX, and the
Clery violations were not egregious enough to result in a ﬁne, OSU
has been litigating and/or cooperating in an investigation for 5 years
now. Even aside from monetary damages, seven-ﬁgure settlements, or
DOE ﬁnes, it is an expensive endeavor to pay the legal fees to
Peer Sexual Violence on Campus ◆71
NJAWHE 2010, 3 (1) © NASPA 2010 http://journals.naspa.org/njawhe/ doi:10.2202/1940-7882.1044
litigate a case and to pay staff to assist in and cooperate with an
investigation.
Thus, there appears to be signiﬁcant truth to the idea that statutes
like Title IX and the Clery Act are giving colleges and universities
incentives to pay attention to victims’ rights and to encourage rather
than discourage reporting (Rosenfeld, 2008, p. 421). It is clear that
the best method for avoiding the many costs demonstrated by the
OSU case is proper handling of campus peer sexual violence cases,
and proper handling involves victim-centered responses that encourage
reporting. Schools that seek to discourage reporting and do not adopt
institutional responses that protect basic victims’ rights do so at their
own legal and budgetary peril. By encouraging their institutions to
develop more victim-centered responses to campus peer sexual violence,
advocates for women in higher education can respond to the current
legal environment, properly confront the problem of campus peer
sexual violence, and help their institutions avoid liability. Therefore,
this paper concludes with some recommendations for schools and
advocates about institutional responses to campus peer sexual violence
that comport with the current victim-centered, report-encouraging legal
climate.13
First and foremost, being victim-centered means listening carefully
to victims/survivors, taking seriously what survivors say they want and
need, addressing the signiﬁcant barriers to helping survivors, and allocat-
ing the institutional resources to accomplish all of the goals. The vast
majority of the reasons survivors give for not reporting demonstrates their
lack of faith in the existing responses and their attempt to avoid the nega-
tive consequences that they believe will come of reporting. Because the
barriers are serious and, even if they were not, survivors’ perceptions of
them make them serious, institutions need to put serious resources
towards overcoming the barriers. This conclusion is heavily implied by
the millions of dollars allocated to the campus grant program created
by the Violence Against Women Act. Therefore, institutions should create
and fully fund an ofﬁce within the institution that can both assist survi-
vors and assist the institution. This ofﬁce can act as both an all-around
resource to survivors, providing a safe and central place to report and to
access the range of services survivors need, and an expert within the insti-
tution who can help it assess and change policies and procedures, train
other staff, and make sure survivors’ concerns are heard and addressed in
decision-making circles.
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Second and related to the above, many institutions need to change
fundamentally the institutional processes that respond to campus peer
sexual violence cases and to stop imitating the criminal justice system in
crafting those processes. Those who have researched and worked on
campus peer sexual violence cases and with survivors already have a good
sense of what processes will encourage survivors to enter the system and
meet their needs once they get there, and it is clear that the processes
used by the criminal justice system do not meet the vast majority of sur-
vivor needs and do not encourage survivors to report. The current state
of the law that applies to institutional responses to campus peer sexual
violence reﬂects and responds to these lessons. In general, we have
learned that school processes not only do not need to imitate the criminal
justice system, but that doing so opens institutions up to greater liability.
For these reasons, institutions are not only able but actually required to
provide “interim measures” to meet a survivor’s needs prior to any disci-
plinary proceeding and to structure their disciplinary proceeding in a way
that puts the accusing and accused students on an even procedural
footing.
“Interim measures” refers to various steps that institutions can take
to allow a survivor to stay in school following the violence, regardless of
whether the survivor seeks redress through a campus disciplinary process
or the civil or criminal justice systems, and even if those measures affect
the accused student prior to or without that student being found respon-
sible for perpetrating sexual violence. These measures include such
methods as changing class schedules and living arrangements, issuing
stay-away orders, and swiftly responding to any retaliation or further har-
assment that may be directed at a survivor after a report. Resistance to
undertaking such measures prior to or in the absence of a disciplinary
proceeding is inappropriate in that it proceeds from “innocent until
proven guilty” concepts drawn from the criminal justice system. As the
preceding analysis demonstrates, criminal law and procedure are largely
inapplicable to campus peer violence, and the law that does apply,
including Title IX, Clery, and court rulings on disciplining student mis-
conduct, allows or requires institutions to take interim measures when
survivors seek them.
Should a survivor wish to initiate disciplinary proceedings through
the institution’s system, procedures can and should once again draw from
the applicable law and not the world of criminal law and procedure. For
this reason, accusing and accused students should be given the same
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procedural rights and, generally, given as much ability to control their
own cases as possible. Any “rights” given in a disciplinary system to
either the accused or accusing student should be provided to the other
student, and “preponderance of the evidence” should be the standard of
proof used. Furthermore, each student should be provided with a trained
advocate who can help the student access and use these “rights” and have
vis-à-vis this advocate all the powers and rights a client would have with
her attorney. This is very different from the criminal justice system,
where victims of crimes are not parties to a case but are merely witnesses
and therefore have fewer rights than the defendant and often do not have
an advocate representing their interests unless they know to employ one
at their own expense.
It is important to remember the reasons why the criminal justice
system is not a good place from which to draw processes and procedures
for campus peer sexual violence cases. Through the criminal justice
system, the state has the power to levy harsh punishments like imprison-
ment and death that implicate fundamental constitutional and human
rights like liberty. Criminal procedural rules such as the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard of proof are used with this context in mind.
In contrast, a college or university may at most expel a student and, even
if that student cannot ﬁnd another school that will admit him, U.S. law
does not currently recognize a constitutional right to an education,
especially not higher education (Rodriguez, 1973). Given the relative
powers and rights involved, it makes sense that the systems look different
and the law deﬁnes the relevant legal rights and obligations differently.
Therefore, in order to be more victim-centered in general, institutions
should get out of the criminal law mindset.
“De-criminalizing” procedures and becoming more victim-centered
in general is about more than just avoiding liability, although that is
a powerful incentive all on its own. The incidence of campus peer
sexual violence is staggering and deeply upsetting, and our ultimate
goal must be to reduce and eliminate the violence itself. Because it is
clear that we need victims/survivors’ cooperation to break the cycle of
nonreporting and violence, becoming more victim-centered in our
institutional approaches and listening carefully to survivors is impera-
tive even aside from what the law says. The fact that the law in this
case is helping to achieve this overarching goal just provides those
who want to stop the violence with another tool to achieve this vital
objective.
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Endnotes
1. A note about language: I will use “victim” and “survivor” inter-
changeably to refer to people who claim they have been victims of
sexual violence. Therefore, “victim” is not a term of art used to indi-
cate a ﬁnding of responsibility for sexual violence. I may use
“accuser” when discussing the role of the victim/survivor in a disci-
plinary proceeding. I will use “perpetrator” or “assailant” when
someone accused of sexual violence has been found responsible or in
discussions where it can be assumed the person perpetrated the
sexual violence, such as statistical analyses. I will use “accused” or
“alleged” to indicate when I am referring to those who have been
charged but not found responsible for committing sexual violence.
Finally, I will use female pronouns to refer to victims because the
majority of victims are women, and male pronouns to refer to per-
petrators and accused students because the majority of perpetrators
and accused students are men. I use “sexual violence” instead of
terms such as “sexual assault” or “rape” because in my view “sexual
violence” is a broader, descriptive term that is, once again, not a
term of art, and which I regard to include a wider range of actions
that may not ﬁt certain legal or readers’ deﬁnitions of “sexual
assault” or “rape.” The term therefore includes “sexual assault” or
“rape,” as well as other actions involving physical contact of a
sexual nature that may not always ﬁt everyone’s deﬁnition of
“sexual assault” or “rape.” While I acknowledge that nonphysical
actions can constitute violence, including those forms of violence is
outside the scope of this paper.
Finally, I use “school” and “institution” to identify either
K-12 schools or higher education institutions, although I use
“college,” “university,” “campus,” or “higher education” to refer to
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the latter category of schools. I use “school” most frequently when
discussing Title IX, which does not generally distinguish between
K-12 and higher education.
2. Although some of the studies that are cited here are somewhat
old, they are included for two reasons. First, they are the most
recent studies that have been completed on this topic. This is par-
ticularly true for the 2000 report, The Sexual Victimization of
College Women, which is the last nation-wide, comprehensive study
to be completed on the topic of sexual assault on college cam-
puses. Second, the ﬁndings of the older studies are quite consist-
ent with the most recent ones, including one from 2007, even
when the studies have been conducted in different decades. This
indicates that the ﬁndings of older studies are still valid in terms
of what we see today.
3. This survey is taken from the Educator’s Guide (Hicks, 2008,
app. IV), which contains one of the most comprehensive collections
of sexual harassment cases and OCR LOFs/CTRs dating back to the
mid-1980s.
4. LOFs/CTRs are generally only available to the general public if
members ﬁle a Freedom of Information Act request. Court opinions,
involving claims of peer sexual harassment are more accessible, but,
most published court opinions deal with whether the court hearing
the case will allow the claim to be decided by a jury or will dismiss
it because it fails to reach a legal standard such as stating a claim
covered by the law or presenting sufﬁcient evidence to create a
factual question a jury must decide. In general, defendant schools in
Title IX cases want a case dismissed before it goes to a jury, since
the jury can ultimately award monetary damages.
5. These cases only include cases where the harassment con-
stituted sexual violence according to the deﬁnition in footnote 1 and
where the court discussed and decided the issue of deliberate
indifference.
6. The cases discussed here draw from case law involving both second-
ary schools and colleges and universities, since Title IX does not
draw distinctions between these two kinds of institutions (Ofﬁce for
Civil Rights, 2001, p. 2).
7. Although Ross v. Mercer University found that a female student who
was drugged and raped by a male student had not shown the dis-
crimination she suffered to be severe, pervasive, or objectively
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offensive, this case appears to be unusual. The court did ﬁnd the
school to have been deliberately indifferent (Ross, 2007, p. 1357).
8. Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist. (2008) appears to come to
a different conclusion on this point, but appears to be an outlier
case.
9. In Wilson (2001), the teacher physically segregated the perpetrator
from the rest of the class, and the principal transferred the alleged
perpetrator to another school; in Gabrielle M., school ofﬁcials moved
the harasser to another class after the second incident; in Clark, both
students were moved to separate classes after one touched the other’s
buttocks twice; and in Staehling, “the perpetrator was taken off the
bus and ultimately sent to another school.”
10. Here, two cases, C.R.K. v. U.S.D. 260 Bd. of Educ. (2001) and
Snethen v. Bd. of Public Educ. (2008), go against the overwhelming
weight of authority.
11. Although there is state law variation on the victim’s side of things,
too, state laws establishing claims for survivors are in addition to the
federal legislative schemes discussed above. In contrast, for the
accused, state law is central.
12. The cases discussed here were drawn mainly from 3–9
EDUCATION LAW § 9.09, the section on student discipline law
from an education law treatise. They are not intended to be compre-
hensive, but merely to give a sense of the range of student miscon-
duct cases in which courts have upheld expulsions.
13. These recommendations not only comport with the law, but also
with the best practices that have been generated in this area by such
entities as the Ofﬁce on Violence Against Women (“OVW”) in the
Department of Justice, which selects recipients for and administers
the Grants to Reduce Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual
Assault and Stalking on Campus authorized by the Violence
Against Women Act (OVW, 2009), criminologists and researchers
who study campus peer sexual violence and school responses to it,
college and university attorneys and experts on student disciplinary
systems, and victim’s rights attorneys and advocates. These best
practices and the recommendations listed here are discussed in more
detail in my Journal of College and University Law article
(Cantalupo, 2009, pp. 665–673, 680–689).
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